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CHECKING OUT OF THE EXCEPTION
To 3-104: WHY PARTIES SHOULD BE
ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WHETHER
CHECKS SHOULD BE PAYABLE ON
DEMAND
LINDA R. CRANE*

Many ajpects of American sodety, including its legal pstem, operate to the disadvantage of minorities.
Obvious examples include inequities in our crimina/justice pstem and in schoolfunding. Much has been
written on those and other topics. This articlefocuses on anotherexample, speci ically on how a sweeping
change to an obscure banking rule regulating the check collectionprocess has negativey affected consumers
in general,and minoritygroups inparticular.
U.S. check collections require a complex sstem comprised of a variety of institutions including
commercial banks, savings and loans, savings banks, and credit unions, as well as the customers who
rej upon them to collect payments from far and near. Traditionaly, the check collection process,
including the timing rules under U. C.C. Article Four,was inherent'ly cumbersome and slow to honor the
paee's right to receive immediate pament offunds from the paying bank. Frustrationamong pajees,
which grew due to not having theirfunds availablefast enough because of delas that were inherentwithin
the sstem, led lawmakers and others to reform the check collection timing rules..
It has now been more than twentyjvears since Congresspassed the Expedited Funds Availability Act
(EFAA), which empowered the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to regulate the speed with which
commercial banks are required to make funds available to depositors after their checks were depositedfor
collection. There is evidence, however, that these reforms have had an negative impact on checking account
customers as a whole, but in particular,a dijproportionateimpact on minority communities.
Speci icaly, bj reducing the maximum amount of waiting time between the date of deposit and the date
when funds are available to deposit customers, the reforms also reduced the time that the funds were
available to the check-issuing consumer. Thus, in eveU checking transaction, checking account customers
lost the benefit of the float that was built into eveU transactionunder the traditionalU. C. C. rules.
It is my thesis, therefore, that recent reforms in the timing rules that regulate the speed of the check
collection process have indeed reduced the wait time for funds to be available, but have also resulted in
increases in the appetite for various riskj cash management alternatives bj consumers to obtain the
money that under old timing rules would stay in their deposit accountsfor a longerperiod. Put another
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. Northwestern University, J.D. /M.B.A.
To the following people and institutions: The John Marshall Law School faculty scholarship research grant; The Midwest
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, Inc.; The Society of American Law Schools; my colleagues, Prof. Kevin
L. Hopkins (John Marshall), Prof. Linda S. Greene (Wisconsin-Madison),; my research assistants, In Yung Yi,
Christopher Ehresman, Jeffrey Gaster, Stephanie Day and the student editors of the Columbia Journal of Race and Law.
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way, consumers who issued checks liked float, too! To address this problem, I will propose two
recommendations that can provide a remedyfor consumers, at their option. First, that the definition of
'"heck " should be changed under both state and ederalcommercial law to remove the limitation that all
checks are due on demand. Second, I propose that the federal check collection timing rules should be
amended to require banks to honor checks that are payable on a definite due date just as they honor
those that arepayable on demand.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is organized as follows:
Part 11 provides an overview of the check collections systems under the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) as well as the pre-reform timing of payment issues that persisted under the midnight
deadline rules. Part III provides an overview and description of the characteristics of the new federal
regulations that have been added to augment the state regulations. Particularly with respect to the new
timing rules, it also provides a comparison of the operation of new timing rules to that of the traditional
timing rules.
Part IV describes the changes in consumer behavior since the federal reforms went into effect,
and posits that data revealing a dramatic increase in risky behavior by consumers, specifically and
disproportionately among minority groups, show a connection between these behaviors and the reform
of the check collection timing rules.
Part V contains two recommendations that provide a solution to the problems that the
regulatory reforms have caused consumers. The first recommendation is that both the U.C.C. and
Regulation CC's statutory definition of "check" should be amended to allow bank drafts to be treated
like all other negotiable instruments, which are able to be payable either at a definite time or on
demand-at the option of the parties at the time of the transaction. The second recommendation is for
bank regulators to require banks to honor presentations of checks that are not payable on demand on
the definite date in the future when they become due and payable.
Part VI provides a brief rebuttal to some potential objections that may be raised in response to
the recommendations made in Section V. Part VII is a brief summary and conclusion.

II.

OVERVIEW OF PRE-REFORM SYSTEM OF CHECK
INCLUDING MIDNIGHT DEADLINE TIMING RULE

COLLECTIONS,

Article 3 of the U.C.C. governs the rights and obligations of parties to negotiable instruments. Its
provisions require that the transfer of checks occur using a special form of transfer called "negotiation"
through which the transferee becomes a "holder" and, therefore, is entitled to enforce it.' Under U.C.C.
Article 3, negotiable instruments fall into two broad categories: notes, 2 which are always two-party
instruments, 3 and drafts, 4 which are always three-party instruments. 5 The definition of "Negotiable
Instrument, U.C.C. 3-104, allows parties to decide whether their instruments will be payable immediately
(demand instruments) or at a definite date in the future (time instruments) 6. Notes and drafts can be
issued without involving a bank as one of the parties. If, however, a bank is a party to a three party draft,
it becomes a "check" 7 as defined by 3-104(f).

1 U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-301 (amended 2002).
2

Seegenerajyl U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-103(a)(8), 3-103(a)(12) (amended 2002).

3 The parties to notes are referred as the "maker" and "payee."
5

Seegenerayl U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-103(a)(8), 3-103(a)(12) (amended 2002).
Drawer, Payee, Drawee/Paying Bank or Paying Bank under Regulation CC 12 C.F.R. § 229.2.

6

See U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (amended 2002).

4

7 The terms "checks," "negotiable bank drafts," and "items" are all used interchangeably through the relevant
state and federal regulations and this article.
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In addition to defining "check" as "a draft drawn on a bank," Article 3 also defines "check" as
"payable on demand." 8 Thus, while the U.C.C. provides parties to notes and drafts broad flexibility to,
choose the precise date when they will be payable, parties to checks are denied this ability.9 Applicable
reforms at the federal level, referred to colloquially as "Reg. CC," define "check" in a similar manner as
"a negotiable demand draft drawn on or payable through .. . a bank .. . ."1o
Somewhat perversely, it is because checks are 3-party instruments that it is so difficult-arguably
logistically impossible-to pay them immediately upon demand. This is because all three parties to a
check have interests that must be balanced-and that takes time-even after the check is presented to
the drawer's bank for payment.
Pre-reform rules under Article 4 of the U.C.C. impose strict timing rules for check collection
once an item is deposited for collection. Among other things, these pre-reform rules required payment to
occur within a limited amount of time after the check was presented for payment." During the collection
process any bank in the chain of collection has up to two days before it must forward the check to the
next bank in the collection chain. This timing of collection and of payment rule is called the "midnight
deadline rule."
Specifically, a bank's "midnight deadline" is defined as "midnight of the banking day following
the banking day of receipt." 12 Under Article 4, each bank that touches a check during the collections
process has a separate midnight deadline. 13 That means that every person entitled to enforce the check
must wait up to two days, multiplied by the total number of banks involved in the process. Of course,
under Article 4 the actual demand for payment does not occur until the check reached the only bank that
could make the payment decision-the paying bank.
Once the check finally reaches its ultimate destination, the paying bank is actually allowed to
await the expiration of two different midnight deadlines prior to becoming legally accountable for the
amount of the item. First, the paying bank has until midnight of the day of receipt to decide whether to
give provisional and revocable credit for the check. Second, if the paying bank gives provisional credit
for the check before midnight of the first banking day on which it receives the check for payment, then
the U.C.C. extends the deadline by which the paying bank must make a final decision to either pay or to
dishonor the check to midnight of the next banking day. Remarkably, it is not until the expiration of the
paying bank's second midnight deadline that it must make a final decision to pay or to dishonor the item
at which time it will either be finally paid or notice of dishonor will be sent to the depositary bank. 14

8

1d
9 Id. (distinguishing "checks" as a special subset of drafts payable on demand and drawn on a bank). U.C.C. § 1104 (amended 2002) allows parties to vary this default rule by agreement, but there is no evidence that banks include
such a waiver in their customer agreements, nor that they honor such items.
10 See Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(k) (2012). Recent events are of importance here. One of my proposals
is to redefine the definition of check to allow consumers to choose the date when the check will become payable. See
infra Section V(A) and accompanying footnotes. After the passage of Dodd-Frank, that task is not so simple as merely
petitioning the Federal Reserve. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 STAT. 1376,
Public Law 111-203, §§ 1011, 1022 (establishing Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and giving it rulemaking
power over federal consumer financial law).
1 U.C.C. §§ 4-203, 4-301 (amended 2002).
12 Id. 4-103(a)(10).
13 Id. §§ 4-203, 4-302.
14

Id. 4-202.
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The "midnight deadline" rule, taken alone, provides no incentives for the collecting banks to
take action before the expiration of their midnight deadline.15 This is only slightly less true for the paying
bank-which is not technically a collecting bank. 16 The paying bank faces the daunting risk of becoming
accountable for the amount of the item if it has not completed its process for determining whether the
item is properly payable from its customer's account prior to the expiration of its midnight deadlines.17
Collecting banks (including the depositary bank, any intermediary banks, and the presenting bank),
however, are only liable for their negligence, if any, for failing to meet their midnight deadlines. 18
Under U.C.C. rules, for the depositor awaiting receipt of the collected funds, the midnight
deadline clock does not begin to run until the check is actually presented to the paying bank when the
demand for payment officially occurred. As an example, the following is an illustration of a short check
collection involving two intermediary collecting banks on opposite coasts. The length of the wait for the
payment decision depended on how many banks were involved in the collection, but could generally be
reduced to the formula 2X = D, where X is the number of collecting banks and D is the number of days
the payee must wait for payment. The paying bank will generally have two days instead of one because
the rule that they must make a final payment decision by midnight of the banking day of receipt is
extended until their real midnight deadline if they give provisional credit on that day. Thus, in a
transaction involving a depositary bank, a paying bank, and two Federal Reserve bank branches on
opposite coasts as well as an additional intermediary bank on either coast, the average length of time that
elapsed between the date of deposit and the date of expiration of the drawee's midnight deadline under
Article 4 was usually more than ten days.19
Historically, the U.C.C. required privity among the parties to a check, including all of the banks
involved in the collection and payment process. This requirement, in conjunction with the liberal
midnight deadline timing of payment rule, complicated the relationships among the collecting and paying
banks, and added more time to the already cumbersome collections process. Consequently, despite the
fact that checks are demand instruments, because of the logistics of the national bank check collections
system, they were never capable of being paid immediately-neither as a practical matter nor under the
applicable U.C.C. rules.
The problems caused by this slow process were not limited to their effects on consumers. The
old check collection rules also produced problems associated with a financial concept called "float." In
general, float results when a bank is credited with funds before they are disbursed from a payee's
account. One specific consequence of bank float that concerned the Federal Reserve Bank Governing
Board is that the funds associated with checks in the collections system were being accounted for in the
accounts of multiple banks, simultaneously. This is due to the banking industry's practice of booking
provisional (temporary revocable) credit for checks on the presumption that they will be honored when
presented to the paying bank for payment. This approach, through which the banks account for the
value of checks while they move through the collection process, while efficient from an accounting entry
viewpoint, created a problematic inflationary impact insofar as it distorted the actual balances of money
on deposit throughout the U.S. monetary system at any given moment. This type of float results from
the fact that funds behind each check were concurrently reflected in the account balances of all of the
banks (depositary, collecting, and paying) during the collection process. Consequently, this float

15

16

Id.

Id. § 4-105(3)-(5).
U.C.C. §§ 4-301-4-302 (amended 2002).
18 Id. §§ 4-105, 4-202, 4-203.
19 2 days x 5 banks = 10 days.
1
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artificially inflates the size supply of money in the banking system 20 and necessarily affects the Federal
Reserve Governing Board's determination of monetary policy. 21
This was the confluence of problems that the U.C.C. could not, or would not, address that
eventually led to federal intervention by Congress. Consumer protection activists and the Federal
Reserve Governing Board, for their respective reasons, sought reform of the check collection process in
part out of frustration with the inaction of state legislatures and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law, which had recently revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 extensively
without changing the midnight deadline collection and payment timing rules. Moreover, Congress was
becoming more engaged in consumer protection and was also aware of the Fed's increasing concern
over the float in the monetary supply. However, it is important to keep in mind throughout the following
sections that although Congressional reforms of timing rules in the check collection process were
justified and overdue, they were not done in a way that proved advantageous for all consumers.
Specifically, the loss of float time created destructive consequences for poor consumers, the
majority of whom are members of minority groups. As will be explored later on in this article, this new
reform resulted in a disproportionate increase of risky behaviors such as borrowing money using payday
loans, credit cards, and HELOCs. These increases were not merely coincidental. Historical data and
social studies suggest that these industries purposefully targeted minority groups for exploitation. The
financial devices in question frequently have significant financial costs. A typical payday loan, for
instance, may end up costing the consumer hundreds if not thousands of dollars in excess of the loan
principal. That is startling, given that a typical payday loan is for only a small amount of money. In the
aggregate, these instruments drain millions of dollars from local communities, making economic and
social advancement all the more difficult.
III.

FEDERAL INTERVENTION AND REFORM INITIATIVES

Even though U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 were amended extensively in 1990, the timing of collection
rules in the "Revised Articles" was not significantly revised. 22 Several state legislatures took steps during
the 1980s to limit the length of hold periods, but the prevailing U.C.C. timing rules remained largely
unchanged. 23 Most notably, the Revised Articles governing check collections retained the midnight
deadline rules despite an ever increasing chorus of customer complaints about the length of their wait
times for their funds to be available following deposits of checks for collection.
In the absence of a meaningful state level response to the unacceptably long waits for funds
availability, Congress enacted two new statutes designed to speed up the check collection process and to
expedite the availability of the depositor's funds. First, in 1987 it passed the Expedited Funds Availability

20

See

Float,

FED.

RESERVE

BANK

OF

NEW

YORK

(April

2007),

http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed08.html (noting that "float is created when a Reserve Bank
credits a bank for depositing a check but has not yet collected funds from the bank upon which the check is drawn. Both
banks now list the funds on their books, and they continue to do so until the check is presented and the Reserve Bank
collects funds from the bank on which the check is drawn. As a result, both banks have use of the same funds for a
short time.").
21 See id. (noting that "although the amount of float is subject to random fluctuations, definite weekly and
seasonal trends have been observed. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York uses these float trends to forecast float
levels. The forecasts are given to the Open Market Desk, which implements the Federal Reserve's monetary policy.
Using these forecasts and other information, the Open Market Desk buys and sells Government securities daily, usually

in an attempt
to smooth fluctuations in the aggregate level of bank reserves.").
22

WILLIAM WARREN & STEVEN WALT, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 3 (Foundation Press 7th ed. 2007).

23

Id. at 167.
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Act (EFAA).24 An important part of the EFAA was its broad delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Federal Reserve Governing Board. The Fed first exercised this authority when it promulgated Part 229
of the Chapter 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (12 C.F.R. Part 229) under the title "Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC)." 25 The second statute, The Check Collections For the
Twenty First Century Act, commonly known as "Check 21", was passed in 2004 and has resulted in
changes to the way banks can process checks and allows them to create substitute checks using image
technology. These additional rules have been added to Regulation CC.
A.

The Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC

Regulation CC was the first of two recent major reforms in the national bank check collection
system in the United States. Regulation CC's primary focus was to impose shorter time limitations within
which depositary banks were required to make funds available to their checking account customers "as a
matter of right." 26 To accomplish this, Regulation CC shifted the focus of the timing rules from counting
the days after the demand is made to a paying bank, to focus on the number of days after the deposit
before which the depositary bank would become accountable. Thus, Regulation CC shifted the liability
for speeding up the timely payments away from the last bank in the process-the paying banks-and
shifted the burden onto the first bank in the process-the depositary bank. Henceforth, funds would be
made available within a set number of days after the deposit, regardless of how many intermediary banks
were involved in the presentation of the check to the paying bank. 27 As a result, Regulation CC required
banks to dramatically speed up the release of funds to depositors and the return processes. 28 In this
respect, the Act protected consumers from excessive delays in payment and helped relieve the problem
of holdover float.
Under the federal law, the speed with which depositary banks must make funds from deposits
available to its account holders is determined by an availability schedule that changes depending on the
nature of the deposit and withdrawal. 29 Significantly, Regulation CC's permanent availability schedule
does not eliminate the midnight deadline rules. Consequently, both sets of timing rules continue to co24 The

Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1987).
Id. The EFAA is found under Title IV of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. The Act was
enacted on August 10, 1987 and was previously known as Section 601 of title VI of the Act of August 10, 1987.
26 See 12 C.F.R. § 229.1(b)(2)-(3)(2012).
Section 229.1(b)(2) states: "Subpart B of this part contains rules
25

regarding the duty of banks to make funds deposited into accounts available for withdrawals, including availability
schedules, disclosure of funds availability policies, payment of interest, liability of banks for failure to comply with
Subpart B of this part, and other matters." Along the same lines, Section 229.1(b)(3) states: "Subpart C of this part
contains rules to expedite the collection and return of checks by banks. These rules cover the direct return of checks, the
manner in which the paying bank and the returning banks must return checks to the depositary bank, notification of
nonpayment by the paying bank, endorsement and presentment of check, same-day settlement for certain check, the
liability of banks for failure to comply with subpart C of this part, and other matters."
27 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2012).
28 WARREN & WALT, supra note 22, at 169.
29 See Appendix B for a chart of the availability schedules. The availability has numerous exemptions that allow
the depositary banks to delay fund withdrawal. The situations include: new accounts where the account is open for thirty
days or less; large deposits where deposits that aggregate more than $5,000 on one banking day; re-deposited checks
where checks have been dishonored and a redeposit is attempted; repeated overdrafts where customer accounts are
"repeatedly overdrawn"; "reasonable cause to doubt collectability" where "the depositary bank has reasonable cause to
believe that the check is uncollectible"; emergency conditions where emergency conditions exist "beyond the control of
the depositary bank, if the depositary bank exercises such diligence as the circumstances require"; "notice of exception"
where notice is given to the customer at the time of deposit; "length of delay due to exceptions" where the bank can
delay availability for "a reasonable period of time" of up to five business days for local checks and six days for non-local
checks. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.13 (2012).
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exist. 30 To co-exist, banks can continue to collect checks using the interbank collections process and are
allowed to make a decision about whether to honor a presentment before the expiration of the paying
bank's midnight deadline as long as they also do so before the depositary bank must make the funds
available to the depositor in compliance with Regulation CC's Availability Schedule.

B.

Check 21

In 2004, more than fifteen years after the passage of the EFAA, the second of the two major
reforms was passed by Congress under the name, The Check Collection for the Twenty-first Century
Act, commonly known as "Check 21." Among other things, Check 21 empowered the Fed to
promulgate regulations to achieve its goals. The Fed did so by adding new provisions to Regulation CC.31
Check 21 continued to speed up the check collection process by removing two impediments that were
unaddressed by the first set of Regulation CC's provisions. First, Check 21 ushered in the demise of the
requirement of privity among the collecting and paying banks. This allowed the depositary bank to
present checks to the paying bank directly regardless of whether they were parties to a separate bankcustomer relationship. Second, Check 21 created the innovation of the "substitute check."
Prior to Check 21, each bank that was negotiating checks in the collections process was still
required to have privity with the next collecting bank in the chain. Moreover, Article 3 negotiation
required each bank to become a holder in its own right, entailing physical delivery of the original check
each time it was transferred throughout the collection process through the time of its presentment for
payment to the paying bank.32 Truncation was not allowed and electronic versions were allowed only
under special arrangements. 33
Check 21, however, allows depositary banks to convert an original check into a substitute check.
Substitute checks can travel through the check-collection system in place of the original paper checkbut they are still paper checks! 34 The substitute check must be a paper reproduction of the original check
that contains an image of the front and the back of the original paper check. 35 The substitute check is
now the legal equivalent of the original check as long as it accurately depicts the front and the back of
the check. 36 Substitute checks remain subject to U.C.C. Articles 1, 3, and 4, and other state law along
with applicable federal law. 37
There is a widely believed misconception that Check 21 actually requires check truncation and
the creation of a new substitute check. It does not. Rather, it provides a structure within which banks
have the option of making speedier presentments by removing legal and logistical impediments, such as
30
31

Id.; see also WARREN & WALT, supranote 22, at 168.
Even though this Article criticizes the reforms for certain failures, it agrees that they were necessary and

overdue. The Article is neither opposed to the movement to reform the check collection timing rules nor to the changes

that they were intended to usher into place. They were overdue given the availability of technology capable of speeding
up the process. They were necessary because banks had little or no incentive to change the pace of collections under the
U.C.C. midnight deadline rules. There are, however, very serious, presumably unintended, consequences that can be
traced to the new rules.
32 U.C.C. § 3-201 (amended 2002).
33 Andrea McGlinn, Book Note, Check Clearingfor the 21st CentuU Act The Impact on Consumers, 9 N.C. BANKING
INST. 179, 180 (2005).
34
Check 21 Implementation Video, ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.eccho.org/history video (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
35 Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Check Clearingfor the 21st CentuU Act-A Wrong Turn in the Road to
Improvement of the U.S. Payments System, 85 NEB. L. REV. 52, 84 (2006).
36 See McGlinn, supranote 33, at 181.

37 Id.
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privity of contract among collecting banks and/or transporting the original check across long distances
for collection. It simply places another arrow in the quiver of banks as they navigate the choppy waters
between state and federal check collection timing rules. Check 21 gives collecting banks the opportunity
to decide whether to take advantage of the federal regulations or not, depending upon their respective
analyses of the associated costs and benefits. 38 One option still available is for banks to keep processing
checks by negotiating them through the slow interbank collection system if they wish. What depositary
banks must do, however, is make funds available to its customers whether or not the paying bank's
midnight deadline has expired.
When a substitute check is created it is still in paper form and is still an Article 3 negotiable
instrument. Check 21 does not require banks to deal with each other directly nor to create substitute
checks. Banks can continue to just operate as they did under Regulation CC and Article 4 using the
movement of the original paper check through the process that they want or they can use the check
substitution.

C.

The Regulation CC/Check 21 Interface

The purpose of the new regulations was to meet the Congressional objective of adding
improvements to the check collection system by expediting the availability of funds for checking account
customers and to ease the way for banks to use diligence to remove impediments to their ability to
process and to pay remote collection items. 39
By making the depositary bank responsible, instead of the paying bank, the EFAA places the
emphasis on the bank that actually controls whether or not the funds are actually made "available" to the
depositor-the depositary bank. This highlights the greatest difference in emphasis between the EFAA
and the U.C.C., which otherwise overlap in various respects: the EFAA limits the time that the
depositary bank has to make the decision to allow withdrawal of funds by the person entitled to enforce
the instrument, whereas the U.C.C. limits the time the paying bank has to make the payment decision
based on whether the item is properly payable by the person who issued it.
By speeding up the process, however, the EFAA exposes depositary banks to losses they did not
face under the traditional midnight deadline regime. Specifically, banks now have much less time to make
an informed decision about whether or not to allow customers to withdraw funds from check deposits.
That fact increases the chances that funds associated with a check that has been dishonored will already
have been released by a depositary bank before it receives notice of dishonor from the paying bank.
There were good reasons for Congress to reform of the check collection system. Along with the
entrance of Congressional intervention has been a steady increase of the Fed's influence in the area of
commercial regulation. The Fed, in fact, has been empowered by Congress to draft the regulations to
accompany the new federal statutes governing check collections, beginning with Reg. CC, and continuing
with Check 21 as well as its 2010 amendments.40
One of the most interesting aspects of the Federal movement to reform the check collection
system is that it has not abolished the midnight deadline rules of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. Rather,
the U.C.C. (which has also been revised extensively and often) has been allowed to co-exist with new
Federal regulations despite the fact that the U.C.C. and federal reforms contain dramatically different and
Felsenfeld & Bilali, supra note 35, at 91-92.
39 12 U.S.C. § 5001 (2006).
40 In fact, the Fed actually took the initiative to actually draft Check 21 and sent it to Congress, which
apparently rubber-stamped it.
38
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potentially inconsistent timing rules. Of course, the Federal regulations trump state law and must be
followed by banks whether or not they continue to satisfy the U.C.C. timing rules.4 1 Moreover, there is
great possibility for additional reform as technology improves because it will become more feasible to
virtually make checks payable "on demand" as still required by both state and federal definitions.
The reforms that sped up the availability of funds following a deposit of a check are best
understood in context, that of a buyer/consumer who uses a check to pay for a purchase of valuable
goods or services from a seller who is willing to wait a brief period to collect the funds from the buyer's
bank. The focus of the reformers was primarily on the seller's demand rights in the instrument. Of
course, it is the seller in the underlying commercial transaction who is entitled to payment and who has
agreed to take a check as a substitute for money with the understanding that the buyer has sufficient
funds on deposit at its bank at the time when the check was issued.
The second party to the three-party bank check is the buyer or consumer in the underlying
commercial transaction who issued the check as payment. Traditionally, rightly or wrongly, the buyer
developed a reasonable expectation that there would be some delay before the money would be debited
against the account from which the check was issued. Not only did these consumers expect a delay in
payment, they perceived benefits from the delay, including continued earning of interest during the delay
period, and continued use of funds. 42
Regulation CC and Check 21 successfully reduced bank float and expedited the availability of
funds to sellers. However, in a significant oversight, the regulators failed to consider the impact of the
reform rules on consumers who were accustomed to using checks to pay for their purchases. The result
was that low-income and minority consumers were left scrambling for alternative cash management
strategies.43

The mid-1950s until 1990 used U.C.C. Article 4 and the midnight deadline rules. From 1990 to 2004, we
have had the EFAA and Regulation CC. From 2004 to the present we have had the Check 21 Act.
42 Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Check FloatPuZZle, 83 FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1, 1-25 (1997).
43
See
The
Color of Debt
Credit Card Debt by
Race
and Ethnici,
DEMOS,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET TheColorofDebt Demos.pdf (last visited Nov.
41

25, 2012) (noting that in 2007, thirty-nine percent of minority consumers used credit cards "to pay for basic expenses"
such as "rent, mortgage payments, groceries, utilities or insurance because they did not have enough money in their
checking or savings account"); see also The Plastic Safety Net: Findingsfrom the 2012 NationalSurvey on Credit card Debt of Low
and Middle Income Households, DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PlasticSafetyNetDemos.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) ("Nearly half of young adults and forty-five percent of households earning less
than $50,000 per year used credit cards to pay basic monthly costs like groceries and rent. Fifty-two percent of
households with members lacking health insurance paid for necessities with credit cards."). By contrast, fifty-four
percent of all households surveyed in a 2007 study reported using checks to cover basic month-to-month expenses. See
PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT AMERICANS PAY FOR-AND How (2007). This information lends itself to the inference
that less lower-income and minority consumers are using checks for their daily expenses. Moreover, the fact that lowincome and minority consumers made the switch is not an accident. Over forty percent of households which relied on
credit card debt for basic daily expenses such as rent did so because their checking accounts did not provide a sufficient
financial cushion. See Demos, PlasticSafety Net. A survey of payday loan users in Texas turned up similar results regarding
the type of expenses that the loans were used for. See Short-term Cash, Long-term Debt, Texas Appleseed, 9-12 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.caction.org/CAN-Research/Reports/2009/Short-termCashLong-termDebt.pdf
("The
majority
of
respondents need credit to cover basic recurring expenses, such as bills, food and rent, or mortgage payments."); see also
PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY (2012) (2012 survey of consumers finding
that sixty-nine percent used payday loans to cover recurring household expenses). In one survey, respondents' answers
were particularly revealing. The respondents, explaining how they used payday loans for recurring expenses, stated:
Male borrower, Chicago:
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CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM

Although it was undoubtedly prudent for the Fed to take steps to reduce the inflationary effect
that the traditional checking system had on the monetary system, in so doing it triggered a concomitant
negative economic impact on consumers. 44 There were, in fact, some fears expressed prior to the passage

"Just need to get to the next paycheck. And I need, you know, either pay the bill to keep the lights

on, or need some food, or whatever it is."
Female borrower, San Francisco:
"If I have bills to pay, or say I need food on the table, I am going."

Male borrower, San Francisco:
"Well, I was a little short and was thinking I could use some more money and I was at the ATM
actually, and it was there, offering me a direct deposit advance. So, I thought I would try it."
44 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Float, supra note 20. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
described the float problem as follows:
For several reasons, float increased sharply in the 1970s. One was that the volume of checks
processed by the Federal Reserve doubled during the decade, increasing holdover float. Also, high
inflation meant that the average dollar amount of check increased. Finally, high inflation, coupled with
high interest rates, provided an incentive for large companies to draw funds from far-away banks to
try to benefit from transportation float. The practice of drawing funds from far-away banks was
known as "remote disbursement."
The Federal Reserve took action in 1973 to reduce transportation float by establishing new
regional check-processing facilities throughout the Federal Reserve System. In addition, efficiency in
the use of air charter service was improved. These measures helped reduce float from a daily average
of $2.7 billion in 1973 to a daily average of $2.1 billion in 1975. However, between 1975 and 1979,
float more than tripled (in nominal terms) to a daily average of $6.6 billion, an all-time high. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System believed that transportation float caused by
remote disbursement had become a serious problem, and issued a policy statement in early 1979 to
discourage the practice.
As part of the Monetary Control Act of 1980s, the Federal Reserve System was instructed to
charge banks for float. As a result of this legislation and greatly improved check processing efficiency,
float was reduced to a daily average of $2.5 billion in 1982, down about 60 percent (in nominal terms)
from the 1979 level. To reduce float further, the Federal Reserve implemented procedural changes in
the 1980s. Among these changes was the establishment of a nationwide noon-presentment policy in
1983 that allowed later delivery of checks to banks in cities with Federal Reserve check-processing
offices. This policy also applied to high-volume institutions in more remote areas that had access to
regional check processing centers. These actions significantly increased the number of checks that
could be collected overnight, speeding the clearing process and reducing float. By 1985, float was
reduced to a daily average of $820 million, down almost 90 percent from its 1979 level. The amount
of float averaged $860 million through the rest of the 1980s.
Developments in the 1990s
In the 1990s, float has decreased further. One reason is that fewer paper checks are being sent to the
Federal Reserve, reducing holdover float. The number of checks processed by the Federal Reserve
decreased from 19 to 15.5 billion between 1993 and 1995. The number of checks processed in the
United States continues to decrease, due largely to the rapid growth in electronic payments. For
example, many employers now offer direct deposit of paychecks to their employees, speeding
payment and reducing float.
Also, the Federal Reserve has been installing new technology since the 1980s to reduce
transportation float. Instead of having their accounts debited upon the physical return of checks,
paying banks have the option of having their checks scanned and converted into electronic
presentments at the Federal Reserve. The electronic presentments are transmitted from the Federal
Reserve to the paying banks, and accounts are debited more quickly. The Federal Reserve is
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of Check 21 about the potential dangers that it would pose for consumers. 45 One such fear was that the
loss of float would result in more returned checks and thus more overdraft fees. It was estimated that by
mid-2005, consumers could be bouncing seven million more checks and paying $170 million more in
fees. 46 A survey suggested eight percent of consumers wrote checks "because they like the float." 47 This
data suggested that consumers liked float just as much as the banks did.
The recent growth in risky behavior among consumers is confirmation of the dangers associated
with the loss of float that was in the system prior to the enactment of Check 21 and the Regulation CC.
News coverage during the economic downturn beginning in 2008 brings this mind as much has been
made in the media of the dramatic increases in unaffordable mortgage debt, payday loans, and other high
risk behaviors that consumers have been undertaking.
The primary thesis of this Article is that many of these risky behaviors are the result of
Regulation CC. Upon losing the time previously built into the cumbersome and slow check collection
process, consumers-especially those who had fewer viable alternatives-began seeking alternative
sources of cash to address the impact of the loss of check transaction float on their ability to manage
their scarce cash resources. These alternative sources are more expensive and thus detrimental to poor
minority consumers eliminating the relative windfall they enjoyed as a result of the "transaction" float
that was built into the old system.
There is little doubt that the primary motive for federal pre-emption of traditional state
governance of the check collection process was, at some level, to protect consumers. 48 But the reforms
are problematic because they addressed a problem by using an approach that failed to anticipate the
pressure they would place on consumers to seek alternative ways to manage their cash. In particular, the
reforms reflect an apparent failure on the part of both Congress and the Federal Reserve Governing
Board to fully consider all of the implications of speeding up the check collection timing rules.
Certainly, there is no evidence that any affirmative steps were taken by either Congress or the
Fed to more completely protect consumers with easy access to a mainstream alternative to replace the
old slow-to-be-collected check. Consumers prefer and need a check that is collected more slowly than
their traditional demand instruments are currently being collected under the new, faster availability
schedules.
By removing all float, the federal regulators left consumers to their own devices to replace the
element of time they once enjoyed under the old timing rules-and upon which they had heavily relied
in their cash management calculus. Since the enactment of Regulation CC and the expedited availability
schedules, consumers facing shrinking windows of time during which they can obtain funds to cover
their checks have turned to three main alternative cash management sources: payday loans, credit cards,

continuing to investigate and implement new methods to speed the check-clearing process. As a
result, float averaged only $774 million in 2000, and it will likely decrease even further as technology
advances.
45 Paul Katzeff, Bank "Float"is Set to Fade-Out, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 11, 2004, at A14; McGhnn, supra
note 34, at 179; see generay Mark E. Budnitz, The Check 21 Challenge: Will Banks Take Advantage of Consumers, 58
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 369 (2004).
46 See "Check 21" Law Benefits Banks But Wil Mean More Bounced Checks & Feesfor Consumers, CONSUMERS UNION

(Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-financial-services/001332.html.
See McGlinn, supranote 33, at 194.
See Frequently Asked Questions About Check 21, FED. RESERVE
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/check2lfaq.htm# (last updated May 1, 2012).
47
48

BOARD

OF

GOVERNORS,
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and HELOCs. All of these alternatives were more expensive than their checks and deleterious to the
economic well-being of the poorest, most vulnerable of all checking account customers.
Timeline data seem to indicate a relationship, between the enactment of the first of these federal
reforms and the increase in the appetite for risk by consumers and consumption for financial products
that allow them to leverage their current income, and thus, to manage their cash in order to make small
dollar purchases. One compelling example of the temporal connection between the reforms in check
collection timing rules and increases in the amount of risk-laden behaviors by consumers to make small
dollar amount purchases is to look at the significant growth of the payday loan industry in the U.S. since
1990-the year the EFAA went into effect. There are also surprising data about the increasing use of
credit card debt and home equity lines of credit ("HELOCs") in the same period.
A.

Payday Loans

The most insidious risky practice that consumers have turned to following the 1990 rule changes
is the use of payday loans. Much has been written about the payday loan industry in legal and economic
journals, and newspapers since the mid-1990s. This scholarship falls into three main categories: articles
that attempt to describe the industry itself, articles that discuss who payday loan customers are, and
articles that try to propose solutions.4 9 My treatment of the payday lending industry proceeds in three
steps: first, I provide a brief history of payday lending, including a discussion of lending practices and
industry trends since 1990. Second, I discuss how the payday lending industry has affected minority
communities. Finally, I discuss broadly the deceptive nature of payday loans.
1.

A Short History of Payday Lending

The modern U.S. payday lending industry can trace its roots back to early twentieth century
salary buyers,50 who offered to purchase someone's paycheck in advance and for a discount.51 These
salary buyers operated the early payday loan stores in order to meet the demand of a growing market of
people, especially immigrants and migrants from rural to urban areas. Their customers were typically
poor working-class people who had current supplemental cash needs but who were unable to qualify for
small dollar amount short-term loans from banks because they were considered too risky. The payday
lending industry began growing exponentially in the 1980s. This expansion is attributable to two factors:
deregulation of the banking industry and a lack of short-term loan providers. The impact of deregulation
was that interest rate caps imposed on lenders were removed. The retraction of mainstream, short-term
loans meant that fewer such loans were provided, forcing consumers to turn elsewhere to satisfy those

49 For a non-exhaustive list of articles providing treatment on the topic of payday lending, see, e.g., Nathalie
Martin, 1,0 0 0 %oInterest-Good While Suppes Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIz. L. REV. 563

(2010); CHRIS GIANGRECO, ANDREA KOVACH, & MATT UNRATH, ALTERNATIVE SMALL DOLLAR LOANS: BUILDING

THE
BUSINESS
CASE,
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ilhnoisassetbuilding.org/sites/default/files/Alt 0%2OSmall%/o2ODollar%/o20Loans%/o20Report%/o20v2.pdf;
PAIGE MARTI SKIBA & JEREMY TOBACMAN, Do PAYDAY LOANS CAUSE BANKRUPTCY? (2009); Mary Spector, Taming the
Beast: Payday Loans, RegulatoU Efforts, and Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961 (2008); Ronald J. Mann & Jim
Hawkins, just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, PredatoULending
and the MitaU: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in MitaU Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005); Creola Johnson,
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or PredatoULending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
50 One scholar has even traced the origins of the payday lending industry back to biblical times. See Spector,
supra note 49, at 969. Interestingly, in the same passage, Spector notes that since Biblical times as well, efforts to regulate
payday lending could be frustrated by intricately designed lending systems. See id.
51 Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessariy Mean OutrageousProfits?, 12 FORDHAMJ. CORP.
& FIN. L. 203, 204 (2007).
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financial needs. 52 By the 1990s, numerous check cashing stores opened. These stores worked solely on
cashing checks. 53 The transition to lending against future checks was a natural next step for businesses
that started out by cashing checks during better timeS. 54
In a typical payday loan transaction, the borrower tenders a post-dated check and proof of
employment to the lender for the amount of the loan, plus a fee.55 The lender then gives the borrower
the loan amount, minus the amount of the fee.5 6 The lender will also generally agree to retain the check
until the date when the borrower's loan matures.57 This time period is generally fast approaching,
typically falling on the borrower's next payday.58 Alternatively (and commonly), the borrower can choose
to refinance the amount of the loan for an additional two weeks if the borrower pays a refinancing fee.
The process for obtaining a payday loan is decidedly less rigorous than the application process
for a loan from a mainstream financial institution. A payday loan applicant needs only to show that she
has a bank account and that she is currently employed.59
In 1990, Regulation CC went into effect and ushered in the new availability schedules that
reduced, if not eliminated the float period for consumers when they issued checks. This new norm also
meant that consumers were presented with a new dilemma. On the one hand, they could continue
writing checks just as they had before the reforms were instituted. However, doing so carried the real risk
of bouncing checks more frequently as they were presented for payment before the funds were on
deposit to cover them, leading to high returned check fees, potential social stigma, inability to access
other banking services due to being seen as a credit risk, and the long-term effects of a poor credit
history. 60 On the other hand, consumers could avoid the new fast checks by taking advantage of the
ability to obtain cash by borrowing against their next paycheck through a new arrival on the cash
management scene: the payday loan. Historical data show that consumers overwhelmingly chose this
new option over the option of writing checks and incurring the risks associated with returned checks.

52

Id. at 205.

53 DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, PAYDAY HOLIDAY:
How HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS 9 (2008), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1032621.
54

Id

5s See Payday Loans Equal VeU Costly Cash: Consumers Urged to Consider the Alternatives, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(Mar. 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt060.shtm. The typical size of a payday loan is
between $200 and $300, plus whatever finance charge the lender applies. See CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, THE PAYDAY LENDING FACTBOOK 2 (Dec. 2004).

56See Payday Loans Equal VeU Costly Cash, supranote 55.
57 Id.
58 Id.

59 See CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 55 ("The borrower presents identification
(typically two forms, one with a photograph), the most recent bank statement, and the latest pay stub; all are typically
required to obtain a loan. . .").
60See, e.g., PEW HEALTH TRUST, UNBANKED BY CHOICE: A LOOK AT How Low-INCOME Los ANGELES
HOUSEHOLDS MANAGE THE MONEY THEY EARN 11 (2010) (finding forty-four percent of banking customers were
charged late fee, and eighteen percent of low-income customers in economically distressed neighborhoods of Los
Angeles incurred late fee charges on their checking accounts). A similar trend in credit card late fees and rate hikes
resulting from late payments prompted a Congressional response. See, e.g., The Crekt Act It's Working, DEMOS,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Credit%20Card%/o20Act%/o20Successes%/20-%0 20Demos.pdf
(last visited Nov. 25, 2012). Specifically, DEMOS found that in 2008, fifty-two percent of credit card holders
experienced a late fee, and fifty-three percent experienced a rate hike, as a result of missing a payment. Id. In 2012, after
passage of the Card Act, which required that card issuers wait at least twenty-one days after a delinquent payment before
charging a late fee or exacting a rate hike, instances of consumers experiencing late fees and rate hikes fell to twentyeight and twenty-nine percent, respectively. Id.
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The data referenced above is exclusively temporal, measuring the number of payday loan shops
in existence after the check clearing reforms went into effect. Following those reforms, the number of
payday loan shops, and consumer demand for payday loans, experienced unprecedented growth. 61
Specifically, consumers have increasingly sought short-term bridge loans secured by their next paycheck
as a way of meeting very short-term cash shortages needed to pay for routine household purchases. This
rise in use of payday loans has closely tracked a corresponding decline in the use of checks. 62 Below is a
chart illustrating this temporal data.
Payday lenders appear to have grasped what banks have not: that consumers enjoy and need a
replacement for float in their short-term cash management options. Further, as is common knowledge,
the average American worker is customarily paid bi-weekly. This is close to the average length of time it
traditionally would take to present and pay a check prior to the reforms. Check use, which still remains
the leading method of payment behind cash, has continued to decline while the number of payday stores
increased by more than 4800% as of 1997 in the years following the introduction of Reg. CC.63 From
61
See CPSS-Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR INT'L
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss54p2.pdf; CPSS-Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR

SETTLEMENTS
(Apr. 2003)
INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Mar. 2008)
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss82p2.pdf; CPSS-Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 2012)
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpssl04.pdf; Profiting from Povery, NAT'L PEOPLE'S ACTION Jan. 2012) http:/www.npa

us.org/files/profiting-from-poverty-npa-payday_1oan report jan_2012_0.pdf see also Robin A. Prager, Determinantsof
Locations of Payday Lenders, Pawnshops, and Check-Cashing Outlets, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Jun. 2009),

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200933/200933pap.pdf.
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Total
Number
Transactions by Check (Millions)
46,569.4
45169.7
43,812.1
42,500
41,222.6
38,821.2
37.281.9
35,040.4
32,798.9
30,557.4
27,955.4
26,054.2
24,464.9
22,838.6
21,276.9

of

Payday
Loan
Stores
(Thousands)
Approximately 2000
Approximately 5000
Approximately 6000
Approximately 8500
Approximately 12000
Approximately 14000
Approximately 20000
Approximately 21,000
Approximately 22000
Approximately 23,000
Approximately 24500
Approximately 24500
Approximately 23000
Approximately 19700
Approximately 20000

The decline in payday lending stores which began around 2007 is attributable in part to increased regulation of payday
lending in some states.
62 There are very few alternatives to short term bridge loans. The examples commonly mentioned include pawn
shops, loan sharks, and title loans. See Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans, 69 U. CIN L. REV. 1257,
1268-69 (2001). In addition, the FDIC has implemented a small-loan pilot program among thirty-one banks nationally.
Each of the banks agrees to make small loans and do not charge significant fees or interest. The borrower also has a
longer amount of time to repay the loans up to three years. However, it is unclear whether or not this program will
succeed in impacting payday lenders. A spokesperson for the payday loan industry notes that their customers are not

likely to visit banks because "banks look down on our customers." It was also noted that many low and moderate
income customers do not use banks because of the way they are treated. See Mark Davis, Banks Test Small Loan Program,
KANSAS CITY STAR, May 11, 2008, at D1.
63 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS

http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2007_payments-study.pdf.

STUDY (2007),

available at
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this, it appears that consumers have turned to payday loans as a favorite way to replace the cash
management function of float. The role of the payday loan as a cash management tool as opposed to a
typical loan is borne out by the data that show that most payday loan store customers are repeat
borrowers, taking out eight to twelve loans per year. 64
Consumer dependence on payday lenders has been exacerbated by the fact that banks have been
reluctant to enter into the small- short-term-loan business. 65 This reluctance can be traced to three related
concerns. First, there is a large concern over the profitability over offering relatively low-interest loans.
Many bank officials actually acknowledge that they believe offering payday loan-like products will be
profitable only if they charge high interest rates. There are also concerns over the reputation of banks
among a broad customer base if they become infected with the same taint that is attached to payday
loans operators. A related concern is that offering a service similar to payday loans could come with
tremendous amounts of criticism from "media, public policy officials, and consumer advocates." 66
It has been estimated that ten million households borrow from a payday store every year. 67
Examination of the demographics of payday loan users reveals the depth of the problems they cause.
According to the demographic data, the typical payday loan customer is forty years old and earns
between $30,000 and $40,000 annually. Half of all customers have an average annual income of between
$25,000 and $50,000.68 Twenty percent have college diplomas and more than half have completed some
college, and ninety-four percent have a high school diploma.
Even more troubling is the fact that payday loan customers are disproportionately drawn from
politically and economically disadvantaged groups: racial minorities, women and military families who are
deliberately targeted by payday loan operators. 69
A 2011 study of the concentration of payday lending operations in several states found that
In North Carolina, three times as many payday lenders per capita are present in African
American neighborhoods as in White neighborhoods. In the state of Washington . . .
they are twice as likely to be located in predominantly African American as White areas,
and they also are concentrated in poverty zip codes. In California, they are eight times as
concentrated in African American and Latino neighborhoods as in White
neighborhoods. Even controlling on income, poverty, population, education, and other
socioeconomic factors, the racial disparity persists. In Denver neighborhoods where the
median income is below $30,000, one check-casher exists for every 3,196 residents

Richard

J. Thomas,

Note: Ro&ng Over Borrowers: Preventing Excessive Refinancing and other Necessay Changes in the
Payday Loan Industy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2401, 2403 (2007).
64

65

Some banks have begun to enter the market, but have only been doing so since around 2007. See Jim

Puzzanghera

Creckt Unions, Banks Grabbing a Share of Paydy Loan Dollars, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/11/business/la-fi-banks-payday-loans-20120311.
66THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, Low-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES & OBSTACLES 10 (2005).
67 Paige Merta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertaino, and Discounting Explainig Patens of
Borrowing,

Repayment
and
Default,
BERKELEY
MIMEO
(2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1319751.
68 GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, MCDONOUGH SCHOOL
OF BUSINESS, GEORGETOWN UNIV., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND
28 (2001), availableathttp://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/Mono35.pdf.
69

Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 67.
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compared with one check casher for every 27,416 residents in neighborhoods where the
median income is between $90,000 and $120,000.70
Given those data, the usage rates among minority groups are hardly surprising. One 2009 survey of
payday loan customers in Texas found that fifty-nine percent of borrowers were women, and forty
percent were single women.7 1 The same study found that forty-four percent of borrowers were Latino,
while thirty percent were African American. 72 A separate study conducted in 2012 found that African
Americans were twice as likely to have used payday loans, despite their considerably smaller segment of
the population. 73 That study found that, overall, African Americans constituted twenty-three percent of
payday loan users, while comprising only twelve percent of the population. 74 Latinos, while comprising
sixteen percent of the population, constituted fourteen percent of payday loan users. 75 Sadly, military
personnel and their families are also frequent targets, and users, of payday loans. 76
2.

The Disproportionate Impact of Payday Lending on Minority
Communities

That payday loan customers are drawn disproportionately from minority groups is not an

accident. In 2007, Bill Harrod, a former manager at an Ohio-based payday lending store, resigned his
position "as a matter of conscience." 77 Mr. Harrod's conscience was offended by the fact that his
employer, Check N' Go, had instructed him to target his marketing towards African American
communities, despite the potential to market their services in more diverse areas.78 He was even
instructed to focus his efforts to market their lending services sourced in Ohio to black communities in
Maryland, a state where such loans were prohibited.79 As described by Mr. Harrod, the industry's deceit
of the African American community was deliberate and recognized no boundaries of decency and fair
dealing:
I was instructed to start attending services at Unity Baptist Church-neither my bosses
nor the lobbyists could do this because they were not black-to gain favor with the
minister there and convince him to support us publicly. I was instructed by my boss to
offer the church $800 to send several children to summer camp in return for the pastor
testifying against . . . on reducing payday loan interest rates. I did this. But in the end, the
minister walked out of the Council chamber without testifying because he was
embarrassed at what he had been asked to do. I was told to pressure him to go back into
the room, but he wouldn't do it.80

70

Charis E. Kubrin et al., Does Frige Bankig Exacerbate Neghborhood Crime Rates? Investgating the Social Ecology of
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On this point, Professor Creola Johnson has identified four advertising and marketing ploys that
lenders use to victimize communities of color.81 First, lenders frequently employ African American
celebrities to establish trust and rapport with the community they are targeting. 82 Second, lenders target
African American communities by partnering with leaders in the African American community,
including local church leaders. Third, lenders hire minorities into sales positions for the purpose of
soliciting business in the local minority community, as was the case with Mr. Harrod. 83 Fourth, lenders
design marketing content that combines racial and religious imagery in order to appeal to faith-based
minority targets. 84
As a result of the advertising and business tactics of the payday lending industry, payday lending
stores are more likely to be situated in areas with large minority populations, 85 and thus payday loan
customers are more likely to be minorities. 86 Due to the nature of payday loans, the eventual negative
effect is that minorities are ultimately more likely to become trapped in a vicious cycle involving payday
loan debt than non-minorities. 87
Of course, concerns about poverty and economic development have long been of prime
importance to African American communities, the intransigence of which have been vexing to
generations of community activists who have worked tirelessly to address these concerns.88 In the
aggregate, payday loans damage communities by perpetuating the continuation of a cycle of poverty,
luring people to borrow money against their future salaries just to pay for current every day needs for
their households. One study of payday lending practices in California found that payday loan operators
sapped $247 million in fees annually from primarily minority communities.8 9 Another study, conducted
across multiple states and regions, found that payday loans extracted $3.1 billion in fees from borrowers,
many of whom are minority or lower-income consumers.90 Without financial resources, it is nearly
impossible to reinvigorate a community. For instance, without a reliable customer base, businesses will
not want to move to a particular community. On a macro level, payday loans therefore reduce the overall
financial well-being of minority communities, thereby retarding economic development and postponing
social justice.
3.
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Another major problem with payday loans is that they are deceptive. Payday lenders frequently
advertise their loan products as "short-term," 91 yet it is clear that this cannot possibly be the case.
Cameron Blakely, a former manager of a payday lender in Washington, D.C., explained how his
employer profited from its payday loan business:
The secret to the success of the payday loan is its deceptive design. Specifically, we made
the process very simple and easy at the front end to get people into the loan. But at the
back end, we made it very difficult for customers to get out of the loan. It became a
situation where our borrowers were like indentured servants, but with indefinite terms of
servitude. They would work and work. But each payday, we'd claim a piece of their
paycheck. Every paycheck. Not only was it hard to escape, but most of our customers
were not fully aware of the desperate situations they were in. They were so confused that
sometimes they would say that they just couldn't live without that extra payday loan cash
coming in-when, in reality, they were not getting any more money out of the loan.
Instead, they were paying money to us in fees over and over again. And that is what was
making their paychecks even shorter than usual.92
Consumers get trapped in a debt cycle using payday loans in many ways. One way, of course, is a
simple inability to repay the loan. At the other end of the spectrum is the situation caused by payday
lenders who fail to explain to borrowers the consequences of making only minimum payments-namely
that minimum required interest-only payments will not ever pay down the principal outstanding on the
loan. 93 In this manner, payday lenders deceive consumers into believing they are paying off their loans
when in reality they are not.
There is also a body of scholarship that suggests that payday loan borrowers have a higher than
average likelihood of filing a personal bankruptcy. A 2001 study found that that 15.4% of payday loan
users had filed a bankruptcy petition. 94 During the same survey period, only 3.7% of the total adult
population had filed bankruptcy petitions. 95 Moreover, sixty percent of payday loan customers had also
maxed out their credit cards. 96 Another study of bankruptcy petitions in New Mexico found that
eighteen percent of individuals filing bankruptcy petitions had used payday loans. 97 These studies only
establish correlation, and therefore standing alone do not support the proposition that payday loans
cause bankruptcy. It is possible that some of these data capture consumers who were well on the way
towards bankruptcy petition before ever taking out a payday loan and may have even postponed the

91 See How it Works, CASHNETUSA, http://www.cashnetusa.com/how-it-works.html (last visited Nov. 2012)
(describing payday loan as " short-term loans with a small dollar amount that are usually repaid upon your next
payday.").
92 Press Release, Ohio Coalition, supra note 77, at 3. Using tactics like this, Mr. Blakely's employer managed to
extract nearly $15,000 in fees to service a loan for $900. That $15,000 represents an opportunity cost between servicing
fees and everything else a consumer may spend money on. In other words, the servicing fees which payday lenders
extract from consumers is money which otherwise could have been spent on goods and services which the consumer
actually wants. This may seem trivial when only discussing a single consumer, but payday lending is a multi-billion dollar
industry, and these fees are the only profit center for the industry. In this regard, the consumer protection issues I have
been discussing tie directly into concerns over the national economy. It is difficult to imagine a productive economy in
which consumers spend all their money servicing loans.
93 Nathalie Martin, supranote 49, at 599.
94 ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supranote 68.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double Down and Out: The Connection Between Payday Loans and
Bankruptg, 39 Sw. L. REv. 785, 803 (2010).
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bankruptcy because of the payday loan's usefulness as a last resort. Still, there appears to be a strong
inference that payday loans increase the likelihood of future bankruptcies. This is especially true given
the evidence that suggests that the payday loan industry preys on financially distressed individuals.

B.

Credit Cards

Credit card usage has increased substantially since the 1990 reforms, despite only moderate
increases in the number of credit card users. There are data, along with anecdotal evidence compiled in
other studies that suggest that credit cards have become an increasingly important cash management tool
following the 1990 check collection reforms.
In 1990, there were 122 million cardholders in the United States and 1.012 billion cards in
circulation.9 8 Credit transactions were valued at $466 billion, and outstanding consumer credit card debt
was $243 billion.99 In 1997, outstanding credit card debt was approximately $526 billion. 100 Three years
later, in 2000, there were 159 million credit card holders and 1.425 billion credit cards in circulation;101
credit card purchases totaled $1.242 trillion, and the total outstanding debt was $680 billion. 102 Eight
years after that, in 2008, there were 176 million card holders and 1.493 billion credit cards in
circulation; 103 credit card purchases totaled $2.153 trillion, and outstanding consumer debt stood at $976
billion. 104 The Census Bureau projects that for 2011 there were 183 million people with credit cards and
1.278 billion credit cards in circulation. 105 The Bureau further estimates that credit transactions for 2011
totaled $2.044 trillion, and total consumer outstanding debt was $897 billion. 106
Though I ultimately conclude that credit card use is a significant problem for consumers (and
minorities in particular), I also recognize that credit cards do provide some important benefits for
consumers. First, for many consumers, credit cards may be the only available source of credit. 107 Also,
credit cards allow consumers greater cash management flexibility because the ability to use credit is less
tied to receiving a paycheck than payday loans or cash. 108
Despite these possible benefits, credit cards also pose significant problems for consumers. First,
credit card agreements are quintessential adhesion contracts in which the consumer's only role in the
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contractual process is to accept or decline the terms as offered.109 The fear that credit card companies
will use this imbalance in bargaining power to their advantage is not merely conjectural: scholars and
lawmakers have already identified several ways in which credit companies insert one-sided, adhesive
terms into their agreements, often to the detriment of consumers. 110 Among others, these include
provisions that allow the credit card company to alter the terms of the agreement at any time for any
reason or that allow them to assess unreasonable penalty fees.111 Inclusion of such terms make credit
cards a risky cash management solution because the credit card debtor is in a considerably inferior
position to that of the lender, which is both more sophisticated economically and holds a superior
relative position in all negotiations. 112 Subsequently, in May of 2009, credit card reform legislation passed
that greatly limited: a) the card companies' ability to change individual interest rates (requires 45 day
advance notice); b) who can receive a credit card (individuals under 21 must prove that they can repay
the money or a parent will pay); and c) how much time people have to pay their bills. 113
The consumer risk associated with large credit card debt was amplified by amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code passed by Congress in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (hereafter "BAPCPA"). Ostensibly, the purpose of BAPCPA was to "improve bankruptcy
law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure
that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors." 114 Congress passed BAPCPA in response to
lobbying efforts by the credit and financial sectors feeling that many consumers were spending recklessly
and then taking advantage of lax bankruptcy rules to escape their debt obligations. 115 The 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code specifically targeted consumer bankruptcy filings in order to
reduce the losses incurred by the credit industry as a result of the ability of credit card holders to
discharge their debts in Chapter seven proceedings. 116 Following the amendments, bankruptcy is a less
viable option for many consumers, meaning that credit card debt is considerably more likely to become
permanent.117
When race is factored into the equation, the problems associated with
exacerbated. Traditionally, minority access to credit was well below that of whites.11 8
are offered credit card agreements, they are frequently on less favorable terms than
receive. 119 Specifically, poor and minority customers were found by one recent study to
109
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pay greater than twenty percent interest on their credit card bills,
Americans paid twenty percent or greater interest than whites. 121

Vol. 3:1
120

and twice as many African

All things considered, it is not surprising that more minorities default on their credit card bills. 122
Such defaults can have terrible consequences for a consumer. When a consumer defaults on a bill, it
adversely affects her credit rating and the all-important credit score-both of which can lead to fewer

future borrowing opportunities and perpetuation of the cycle of poverty. 123 That, in turn, can make it
difficult to obtain additional credit. 124 When additional credit is available at all, it is often at even higher
interest rates. 125 That leads to a potential debt cycle, and due to BAPCPA, that debt is increasingly
difficult to discharge. A poor credit rating can also negatively affect current and future job prospects.
Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)

C.

HELOCs are a form of credit that is tied to the equity a consumer has in his or her home, and
which collateralizes the consumer's home as security for the instrument. 126 In 1991, 282,000 U.S.
households had a home equity loan. This number increased at a gradual pace until 1997.127 In 1997, the
number of HELOCs totaled 433,000,128 and in 1998, this number increased substantially to 753,000. By
2000, there were 1,272,000 households with HELOCs. 129 Industry sources estimated that by early 2010
there were 5.4 million HELOCs. 130 HELOCs were preferred by consumers because they were a more
affordable type of credit than credit cards. 131
Like the other forms of credit discussed in this article, however, HELOCs pose substantial risks
to consumers which render them less than ideal cash management devices. 132 There is evidence that,
over time, creditors offering HELOCs have been engaging in predatory conduct. Specifically, the main
predatory practice that HELOC lenders use is the offering of credit itself, specifically offering a HELOC
to homeowners who cannot be reasonably expected to repay the loan.133 Lenders encourage consumers
to take out HELOCs using several strategies. Some lenders, for instance, instruct consumers to lie on
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their applications about how much they earn, thereby increasing their rates of approval.134 Other lenders
advise homeowners to convert their current mortgages into new, longer term mortgages without
explaining the total amount by which principal debt will increase over the life of the loan. 135 Still, other
lenders offer consumers a HELOC based on an inflated value of the home and/or the amount of the
consumer's equity. 136 This is especially risky after the housing bubble burst because home prices have
decreased dramatically, making it more difficult for consumers to recoup the value of their home or to
maintain the ratio of loan to equity that the loan agreement may require. 137
Banks are aggressive about protecting themselves against the risks associated with HELOCs.
During the 2008 housing bubble, as home prices fell and home equity levels declined, many banks froze
or reduced their HELOC lines. 138 This means that consumers who depended on HELOCs as ax cash
management strategy may now need to look elsewhere. In addition, defaulting on a HELOC brings with
it the very real likelihood that the consumer's home will be foreclosed upon. 139 For these reasons,
HELOCs are not advisable as a short-term cash management strategy for consumers looking for a
replacement for the float that was built into the pre-reform check clearing.
Finding themselves squeezed on all sides, some consumers are imbibing a mixture that combines
a HELOC, credit cards, and payday loans. To say that this is a potentially lethal financial cocktail for the
unsophisticated population of working poor is an alarming understatement.

V.

TWO RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

The Statutory Definitions of "Check" Under Both the U.C.C. and Regulation CC
Should Be Amended to Remove the Requirement That They Are Payable on
"Demand"

The first recommendation is for both the re-drafters of the U.C.C. and Congress to change the
definition of "check" to include drafts drawn on banks that are either time instruments or instruments
that are payable on demand. As a result, checking account customers would have the option of issuing
checks with short-term future due dateS140 in addition to traditional bank drafts that are payable on
demand. 141 The benefit to bank customers who use short-term time drafts instead of those that are
payable on demand would be that they would have control over the date on which the bank would debit
134
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their accounts to pay checks that are deposited when issued but prior to the date when they are payable.
This would give parties to checks control over the timing of the payment of the checks in the cases
where their checks are issued with due dates; and once again allow them to issue checks that would not
be paid immediately. This is better because it opens the opportunity to allow checking account
customers to bargain for the same amount of time that they once had, with fingers firmly crossed, under
the old, pre-reform, slow check collection timing rules.
I believe that having this option would appeal to most checking account customers, especially
the working poor. My preliminary research reveals that this recommendation has great appeal to another
important group of users of checks-business owners. This relatively financially powerful constituency
has relied very heavily upon checks because they offer business owners controls when managing their
cash needs, working capital, and record keeping.
B.

Regulation CC Should Require Banks to Offer Checking Customers a New
Check With a Future Due Date and That Can Be Deposited When Issued But
Not Payable Until Due

Payday loan store operators seem to recognize that consumers need this option and yet
community and commercial bankers and their federal regulators do not. Therefore, my second
recommendation is for Regulation CC to be amended adding a provision requiring the creation of a new
bank product in the form of a check with a due date draft-or a check that is payable on a definite future
date rather than on demand. 142 This new check would have two date lines: one for the date when the
check was issued (this is the purpose of the current date line on demand instruments); and the new,
second line for the date when the check will be due and properly payable by the paying bank.
This new category of check transactions would also match the expectations of parties who can
negotiate freely to use, or to not use checks with a future due date. This new check will provide many
consumers with a much-needed alternative to payday loan stores, credit cards, HELOCs, and other
devices; thus ensuring benefits to the economic and financial integrity of consumers who are clearly
demanding better alternatives and more flexible bank products.
It also has the benefit of simplifying the law of negotiable instruments, both state and federal, by
eliminating the unnecessary exception to the general rule that parties to all instruments have the
flexibility to enter into commercial transactions confident that they can bargain for the most favorable
terms they can muster, including whether they must be able to pay on demand or whether they will have
until a future date to make payment according to their private transactional reasons and bargaining
power. With today's technology making it easier for banks to accommodate the tracking involved with
sorting checks, the burden of implementation is far outweighed by the burdens on consumers, especially
poor and minority consumers who have a clear need for this bank solution. 143

VI.

POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
142

See Appendix C for an example of what this new instrument may look like.
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See Appendix C: New proposed check with two date lines, one for the date of issuance that is currently featured on
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date at a definite time in the future for checks that are time instruments under the new proposed redefinition of "check"
for both Article 4 and Regulation CC.
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I have made two recommendations for changes in both the law and banking practices to help
consumers navigate the post-reform checking landscape more successfully than they have heretofore. I
assume that helping consumers in these ways would improve the track record of the reforms themselves,
which are justified only to the extent that this federal intervention in states' jurisdiction over the
commercial lives of their citizens is based on the federal government's interest in protecting consumers.
Obviously, these recommendations are not minor, and they may be met with some criticism or
objections. There are a number of foreseeable reasons that seem to explain why banks may balk at
having to live with the recommendations, if implemented. This section attempts to address what I feel
could be some of the more vigorous objections to my recommendations.
A.

The "Redundancy" Objection

One possible objection may attack the necessity of the new instrument on the grounds that
banks already offer overdraft protection for customers who write checks against insufficient funds.
There is, however, an important distinction between offering a service to remediate a wrong and one that
offers an option to engage in a positive transaction. This is especially important for poor and
marginalized consumers who may not qualify for overdraft protection nor benefit from the service if it
requires them first to be humiliated and admonished by a fee for being allowed to avoid harsher
penalties.
This new time draft would also not be redundant insofar as it is additive by increasing the
number of payment methods that are available to buyers and sellers who could consider using this new
payment instrument for their transactions at their option. Increased availability of options for completing
and paying for their obligations is essential to the freedom of the parties to contracts to engage in
commercial transactions that allow them to participate in a vigorous marketplace and to be creative in
the way they agree to terms.
B.

The "Implementation" Objection

Another potential objection to using the new time check is that the product could be difficult to
implement. How would a bank process checks that are due on various different future dates? In today's
technological environment, I do not think that this would be hard at all. Banks have been forced to ramp
up their use of sophisticated technology in order to achieve the objectives of rules of regulators and
judges for various other purposes. In fact, the federal regulation that first required expedited check
collection stated that the law was timely because the banks had the available technology to implement
the changes and that additional regulations would follow as technology improved over time. This same
technology can be employed for this purpose, as well.144
Modern pre-printed checks are embedded with Magnetic Ink Character Recognition software
(MICR codes) that allow banks to encode information into checks and to retrieve it later. For example,
checks are now pre-printed so that their MICR lines are populated with information such as the bank's
American Banking Association routing number, the customer's checking account number, and the check
number. Additional information can be added to the check throughout its life as well, such as when the
amount of the check has been added after it has been presented and paid; or when additional bank
endorsements are made on the back of checks during the collection process. Using this existing
technology, MICR code positions could be dedicated for use whenever a check that has been deposited
has a due date that is different from its issuance date.

144 Expedited
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With today's technology, a check that is issued today but not properly payable until two weeks
from now could be deposited for collection today (instead of waiting two weeks to deposit a post-dated
check), and the paying bank could input the payment date information that would result in the payment
of the item on the future date instead of immediately. Banks could program available positions in the
MICR line or use other technology already being used during the process of posting checks to
correspond to the due date for the time instrument.
C.

General Business Objections

A final, practical objection is that banks simply may not be sure that a suitable business model
can be developed. Banks currently earn substantial revenue from the fees they charge when a consumer
has written a check with insufficient funds. Banks will charge fees ranging from $15 to $40 per check to
avoid bouncing the check. Bank service fees are a major source of revenue for banks with $32.6 billion in
fees collected in 2003.145 Banks will want to charge a fee for the service, no doubt, so vigilance should be
used to make sure that such fees are reasonable and subject to limitations akin to those that govern fees
for stop payment orders. In general, however, I have no objection to a reasonable fee for this new
service.
No matter the precise reason, banks will undoubtedly need to be prodded to offer this option in
the form of a new check with a future due date, especially given the fact that they have not offered it on
a voluntary basis heretofore. It is for this reason that my second recommendation calls for a new federal
regulation to compel banks to make this new check available and to honor them according to their
terms, including a term specifying timing of payment.

VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Check collection reform at the Federal level was necessary because of the length of time that it
took to collect checks under the U.C.C., but because the traditional check is a demand instrument and,
therefore, payment is due immediately to the person entitled to enforce it. An instrument that is due
immediately should be capable of being paid without delay, and certainly in less than two weeks, or even
one week. Demand instruments are due immediately, and yet it was impossible for payees to receive
payment immediately using the traditional system of slow bank collections.
It is axiomatic to say that a law that is incapable of being enforced is bad law. Similarly, a right
that cannot be enjoyed is a wrong. The reason the reforms to the check collection timing rules are
problematic is not because they are not necessary-they were. Rather, the problem is that they were
implemented as though they existed in a vacuum and without a full understanding of all of the formal
and informal dynamics within the old system. I think that it is very important to consider that consumers
were accustomed to, and continued to need, checks that were collected more slowly than they were
under the new expedited collection regulations ushered in by the reforms. The Federal Reserve
Governing Board failed to provide for the ongoing demand by consumers for a financial product that
was a replacement for the old slow-to-be-collected check, but that was still a check, not something else!
Specifically, consumers needed a check that was not payable immediately.
The controlling law governing the creation of different types of negotiable instruments,
including checks, is still U.C.C. Article 3. Under Article 3, there is no requirement that checks must be
payable on demand. Although they are never created as such, consumer transactions could be completed
See Thomas P. Lehman, Contrasting Payday Loans to Bounced Check Fees, CONSUMER
FOUNDATION, http://www.creditresearch.org/editor/assets/files/050608ContrastingPdayLoans.pdf
145
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using checks that are issued on demand with due dates just as readily as when they are issued without
due dates.
Clearly, consumers' behavior changed dramatically in ways that have hurt the U.S. economy and
have contributed to the current economic crisis. These changes are traceable, at least in part, to
consumer demand for short amounts of time delays between the time of their transaction and the time
when payment is completed. What payday loan store operators seem to understand is that consumers
need a relatively short amount of time before they have money in their accounts that is roughly
equivalent to the time between their pay checks (in the United States, this is two weeks).
Banks in the United States have failed to compete with payday loan store operators even though
it is clear that there is a huge demand for short-term financial relief in the checking account customer
base. The solution is not to go back to a slower collection system for demand drafts, but a reasonable
response that gives consideration to a variety of factors.
The first recommendation is to change the definition of "check" under the applicable U.C.C.
and Federal regulations. The change would remove from the definition the exception that makes all
checks "payable on demand." Implementation of this recommendation would require the re-drafters of
the U.C.C. and the Federal Reserve Governing Board to redefine "check" under the U.C.C. and
Regulation CC, respectively, to accommodate the need to allow consumers to bargain for the inclusion
of a due date term when issuing personal checks. Consequently, checks would become like all other
negotiable instruments-payable either "on demand," or "at a definite date" at the option of the parties.
This approach is already authorized by existing U.S. laws of negotiable instruments. It would also match
the expectations of parties who can negotiate freely to use or to not use the new payment instrument. It
will provide many consumers with a much needed alternative to payday loan stores.
The second recommendation is for Regulation CC to be amended to require banks to offer a
new service that would recognize and honor the timing of payment terms of any check that had a due
date just as easily as they do for checks that are payable on demand.
Both of these changes will go far to improve the prospects of consumers who are clearly
demanding better alternatives and more flexible bank products.
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APPENDIX A
Forward Check Collection Process
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APPENDIX B
Regulation CC Availability Schedule
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APPENDIX C
Example Bank Draft
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